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Moore v. The Queen Revisited 
Sheila Sullivan, B.A., LLB. (Police Academy) 
Remember Moore v. The 
Queen, 1 the 1978 Supreme Court 
of Canada ("SCC") decision about 
the bicyclist who went through the 
red light in Victoria? If you went 
through training at the Police 
Academy since that time, you have 
probably been told that it is an 
important case. I remembered the 
case from my Academy days, but I 
recently discovered that I really did 
not know its significance, nor did 
anyone else I asked. So I read the 
Moore case and realized why its 
importance had been stressed in 
training. The purpose of this article 
is to revisit the significance of this 
judgment for operational police 
officers. 
Facts 
A Victoria police constable ob-
served Mr. Moore riding his bicycle 
through a red light at an intersec-
tion in Victoria, B.C., contrary to the 
provincial Motor Vehicle Act.2 The 
constable then attempted to stop 
Moore in order to give him a ticket 
for that offence. After much trou-
ble (Moore refused to stop), the con-
stable was successful in stopping 
Moore; however, he refused to iden-
tify himself and attempted to leave. 
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After a brief struggle, Moore was hand-
cuffed and arrested for obstructing a 
police officer. 
Moore was acquitted at trial, the 
judge holding that, since Moore had 
no statutory duty to identify himself, 
there was no evidence that he was 
willfully obstructing a police officer. 
The B.C. Court of Appeal ("BCCA")3 
and the sec both held that the trial 
judge was in error, and that Moore's 
failure to identify himself in the circum-
stances of the case was sufficient to 
constitute obstruction of a peace of-
ficer. A new trial was ordered. 
"Willfully Obstructing" 
The central issue in the Moore case 
was whether the failure to identify one-
self when found committing a provin-
cial offence can amount to obstruct-
ing a police officer under the Criminal 
Code4 ("Obstruct PO"). Both the 
BCCA and the SCC distinguished be-
tween a case where the police officer 
is attempting to enforce a law which 
the officer observed the suspect to 
break (as in the Moore case), in which 
case failure to identify oneself will 
amount to obstruction, versus a case 
where the police observe a subject 
acting suspiciously, but had no 
grounds upon which to arrest or oth-
erwise charge the subject, in which 
case failure to identify oneself does 
not amount to obstruction. 
The BCCA rejected the argument 
that Moore was entitled to refuse to 
identify himself as part of his privilege 
against self-incrimination. The BCCA 
held that, although the privilege 
against self-incrimination would ap-
ply in a case where a police officer is 
conducting an investigation with no 
ascertained suspect (and failure to 
identify oneself would not amount to 
obstruction), on the facts in Moore, 
it was simply a case of attaching the 
correct name to an ascertained of-
fender. ·5 
The BCCA found that establish-
ing the identity of a person that a con-
stable finds committing an offence is 
an essential part of policing for the 
purposes of adequately enforcing not 
only the criminal law, but provincial 
laws and municipal bylaws as well.6 
The BCCA further held that the com-
mon law requires a person so caught 
to answer questions regarding iden-
tity and to answer them truthfully. 7 Mr. 
Justice Carrothers put it this way: 
... where the peace officer has 
directly observed the commis-
sion of the offense, has cornered 
the very culprit seen by him to 
commit the offense, and all that 
remains is to identify the culprit 
for summary kerbside [sic] 
"ticketing" purposes and thus 
bring the offender to 
justice .... [a]bsent that identifica-
tion, the peace officer's duty 
would be completely frustrated. 8 
The SCC agreed with the BCCA's 
reasoning and held that in the circum-
stances of Moore, where the consta-
ble had observed the offence, cap-
tured the offender and was attempt-
ing to issue him a ticket, failure to 
identify oneself would amount to 
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"willfully obstructing:'9 Mr. Justice 
Spence, writing for the majority of the 
sec, said: 
... I am of the opinion that the 
officer was under a duty to at-
tempt to identify the wrongdoer 
and the failure to identify him-
self by the wrongdoer did con-
stitute an obstruction of the po-
lice officer in the performance 
of his duties. 10 
Power to Arrest For 
Provincial Offense 
While it was the obstruction ques-
tion the courts were called upon to 
answer in Moore, and the knowledge 
that the obstruct provisions do apply 
is useful to operational police offic-
ers, the case is persuasive authority 
for a still more useful proposition: that 
police may, in certain cases, arrest 
offenders for offences against pro-
vincial statutes even if there is no ar-
rest authority in the provincial stat-
ute creating the offence. 
In deciding Moore, the judges of 
both the BCCA11 and the SCC12 dis-
cussed the application of s. 101 of 
the provincial Summary Conviction 
Act (nows. 122 of the provincial Of-
fence Act13 ). While the comments by 
the judges are, strictly speaking, 
obiter dictum (they were not neces-
sary to decide the case and are not· 
binding as precedent) they are still 
persuasive, and coming from the 
sec, would probably be applied in 
circumstances similar to the Moore 
case. 
Section 122 of the Offence Act is 
difficult to read and I do not propose 
to recite it here. Generally, it says 
that for the purpose of provincial of-
fences, the provisions of the Crimi-
nal Code respecting summary con-
viction offences apply. For our pur-
poses, this means that a provincial 
offence can be treated the same as 
summary conviction offences under 
the Criminal Code, and that the pro-
visions in the Criminal Code which 
relate to summary conviction of-
fences apply to provincial offences. 
Of specific relevance in the Moore 
case were a peace officer's powers 
of arrest for summary conviction of-
fences. Powers of arrest for peace 
officers are laid out in ss. 495(1) and 
(2) of the Criminal Code. 14 According 
to these provisions, a peace officer 
may arrest a person for a summary 
conviction offence if: (1) the peace 
officer found the accused committing 
it, and (2) the arrest is necessary for 
the purpose of establishing identity.15 
The BCCA in Moore noted that, 
by virtue of the statutory provision in 
the Summary Conviction Act (now the 
Offence Act), the Criminal Code pro-
visions regarding a peace officer's 
powers of arrest apply to provincial 
offences, which are treated as sum-
mary conviction offences. 16 The 
BCCA went on to note that, as a re-
sult of the combined effect of these 
provisions, the duty of the arresting 
officer was to identify Moore in order 
to ticket him; and failing that, to ar-
rest him.17 
The SCC did not dwell on this is-
sue; however, the majority concurred 
with the BCCA's interpretation of this 
section of the Summary Conviction 
Act and found that once Moore failed 
to identify himself, the arresting of-
ficer could have arrested Moore for 
the summary conviction offence of 
proceeding against a red light at an 
intersection if it were necessary to 
establish his identity.18 There is no 
reason to believe that this rationale 
would not apply to all provincial of-
fences for which there is no other 
statutory power of arrest. 
Conclusion 
Despite an extensive search 
have not located any cases which 
have criticized or rejected the reason-
ing in Moore. Consequently, even in 
the wake of the Charter (which post-
dates Moore) it appears to remain 
"good law" on both the obstruct ques-
tion and the application of the Crimi-
nal Code summary conviction offence 
arrest provisions to provincial of-
fences. 
As a result of the Moore case, a 
peace officer who finds someone 
committing a provincial offence may 
arrest that offender if the offender 
refuses to identify her or himself. In 
such circumstances the officer has 
authority to arrest for: 1) the provin-
cial offence (e.g. red light at intersec-
tion) by the combined operation of 
the Offence Act and the Criminal 
Code, or 2) for the Criminal Code of-
fence of Obstruct PO. In either case 
the peace officer must, as in all de-
tentions, Charter and warn the of-
fender. If at any point in the process 
the offender decides to cooperate and 
satisfactorily identifies him or herself, 
the investigator must release the per-
son in accordance with s.495(2) of the 
Criminal Code and retains discretion 
whether to charge the offender solely 
for the provincial offence, for the 
Obstruct PO offence, or both.19 If the 
·offender continues to fail to identify 
her or himself, it may be necessary 
to hold the offender for court and 
complete a Report to Crown Counsel 
for the original offence, including de-
tails about the failure to identify and 
the reasons for arrest. 
One last observation. Although the 
courts in Moore did not address the 
issue specifically, there is no reason 
to suspect that the other enumerated 
grounds in s.495(2) could not be re-
lied upon to found an arrest in appro-
priate circumstances. Therefore, 
where a peace officer finds a person 
committing an offence against a pro-
vincial statute and the arrest of that 
person is required to: 1) secure or pre-
serve evidence of or relating to the 
offence, or 2) prevent the continua-
tion or repetition of the offence or the 
commission of another offence, the 
arrest would be authorized by the 
combined operation of the Offence 
Act and Criminal Code. It is my hope 
that in revisiting the Moore case I 
have identified and emphasized its 
usefulness for operational officers. 
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Show and Tell: Disclosure 
in Criminal Cases 
A.Jeffrey Wright, B.A., M.A., LLB. (RCMP Commerical Crime) 
As a general rule police officers 
do not concern themselves with the 
names of cases that, over time, wind 
their way through the court system 
until finally the Supreme Court of 
Canada ("SCC") releases a decision. 
From time to time, however, the 
release of a finding imprints that 
case name into the minds of all 
police officers. Such a name is that 
of Stinchcombe. The SCC released 
its unanimous decision in the case 
of R. v Stinchcombe1 in November 
1991, and altered forever the rules 
concerning disclosure in criminal 
cases. This article will review the 
principles of disclosure that were set 
out in Stinchcombe, and the 
obligations it placed on police 
officers. 
Background 
Not everyone may be familiar with 
the facts of the case. Stinchcombe 
was a Calgary lawyer charged with 
breach of trust, theft and fraud for 
allegedly using funds, held in trust for 
a client, for a purpose other than that 
which was intended. At the 
preliminary inquiry his secretary gave 
evidence favourable to the Defence. 
She was subsequently interviewed by 
the police on two separate occasions; 
once following the preliminary and 
once during the trial. While Crown 
advised Defence prior to the trial that 
the secretary had provided a tape 
recorded statement, Crown refused to 
divulge the contents of the statement. 
Further, the trial judge rejected 
Defence requests that Crown be 
ordered to disclose the statements, 
and requests that either the Court or 
the Crown call the witness to give 
evidence. Stinchcombe was 
convicted at trial and his appeal to the 
Alberta Court of Appeal was 
dismissed. The matter was then 
appealed to the SCC. The issue to be 
determined was what duty the Crown 
had to disclose information, and what 
types of information had to be 
disclosed to the Defence or accused 
in a criminal prosecution. 
At the core of the disclosure issue 
were concepts integral to our justice 
system: the presumption of 
innocence, the Crown's obligation to 
see that justice is done and not merely 
register a conviction, the right of an 
accused to know the case against him 
or her, the right to put forward a 
defence, and, not insignificant, the 
application of "the principles of 
fundamental justice" as embodied in 
section 7 of the Charter. After 
examining the history of the issue of 
Crown disclosure in criminal cases, 
noting that full disclosure was already 
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taking place (to varying degrees) in 
many jurisdictions, and noting the 
practice of full disclosure in civil 
proceedings, the sec found it 
relatively easy to conclude that the 
disputed material in the Stinchcombe 
case should have been made 
available to the Defence and, 
therefore, ordered a new trial. As 
Sopinka J., speaking for the Court, 
noted: 
It is difficult to justify the 
position which clings to the 
notion that the Crown has no 
legal duty to disclose all 
relevant information. The 
arguments against the 
existence of such a duty are 
groundless while those in 
favour, are, in my view, 
overwhelming.2 
The Principles 
Apart from certain exceptions 
noted below, the result of tliis 
decision is that an accused is entitled 
to all relevant information in the 
possession of the Crown so as not 
to impede "the ability of the accused 
to make full answer and defence."3 
In addition, it cannot be forgotten that 
"the obligation to disclose is a 
continuing one and disclosure must 
be completed when additional 
information is received."4 There are 
exceptions to the disclosure rule, 
including: a) when it would not be in 
the public interest for the information 
to be disclosed;5 b) when disclosure 
would jeopardize the identity or 
safety of an informant,6 c) when 
disclosure would hamper an ongoing 
investigation or the integrity of police 
investigative techniques; and d) 
when disclosure would breach a 
recognized legal privilege (e.g. 
solicitor-client privilege). 
The key term to determining what 
information must be disclosed by the 
police and Crown is "relevance." 
What relevance means in the 
criminal context is whether the 
particular piece of information could 
possibly have a bearing on any 
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material issue to be dealt with in 
relation to the specific case. As is 
obvious, that is a fairly low threshold 
test. Relevant material would include 
all statements provided to the police 
or Crown; whether or not the Crown 
intended to ever call that particular 
person as a witness, but would not 
necessarily include the names of all 
persons spoken to during the 
investigation if some of those persons 
were unable to supply any information 
concerning the offence. Relevant 
information may also include the 
criminal record, if any, of Crown 
witnesses. For example, if an 
individual was charged with theftfrom 
his or her employer and one of the 
witnesses for the Crown was another 
company employee, it may be 
relevant for the Defence to be aware 
that the witness has been convicted 
of a similar ("integrity") offence. 
Conversely, in the same case, it 
would not necessarily be relevant for 
the Defence to be aware that another 
Crown witness had been convicted 
of an offence unrelated to theft/ 
integrity; such as Causing a 
Disturbance. The SCC dealt with the 
issue of relevance in the case of R. 
v. Egger stating that: 
One measure of the relevance 
of information in the Crown's 
hands is its usefulness to the 
defence: if it is of some use, it 
is relevant and should be 
disclosed ... This requires a 
determination by the reviewing 
Judge that production of the 
information can reasonably be 
used by the accused either in 
meeting the case for the Crown, 
advancing a defence or 
otherwise in making a decision 
which may affect the conduct of 
the defence such as, for 
example, whether to call 
evidence.7 
The wording of the Stinchcombe 
decision does not state that the Crown 
is obligated to disclose only relevant 
material, rather, the decision 
expresses the Crown obligation in the 
negative: Crown's obligation is to 
disclose all material except that 
which is "clearly irrelevant:•s This 
language has the effect of increasing 
the burden on the Crown (and police) 
to disclose material of even 
questionable relevance. That 
obligation is made clear by the 
passage in the judgment which notes 
that "the Crown must err on the side 
of inclusion."9 
The Crown Counsel Policy 
Manua/for British Columbia outlines 
how disclosure is to be accomplished 
in this province. When the police 
submit a Report to Crown Counsel it 
should contain all relevant 
information in the possession of the 
police. Included with that package 
of material should be the facts of the 
case as they are known, the written 
statements or "will says" of all 
persons proposed . to be called as 
witnesses, copies of any documents, 
exhibits, authorizations or warrants, 
and copies of any investigative notes 
made by officers involved in the 
investigation. The package should 
also include relevant information in 
the possession of the police even if 
it is not intended to be used as part 
of the Crown's case. This would 
include statements or "will says" of 
persons spoken to by the police, who 
had knowledge of the offence or 
circumstances surrounding it, but 
whom the police or Crown do not 
intend to call as witnesses. Should 
the case concern one of the 
exceptions to disclosure (e.g. 
informant, investigative technique, 
public interest, or privilege) it is 
crucial that the Crown be informed 
so that the appropriate decisions can 
be made and no improper disclosure 
will take place. 
All disclosure in this province 
should take place through the Crown. 
If the police are faced with a request 
for disclosure direct from the Defence 
the request should be referred back 
to Crown. It is Crown that has the 
responsibility for determining the 
relevance of any material requested 
by the Defence. Defence may 
request further disclosure from. the 
Crown on a certain point. If Crown 
feels the material is clearly irrelevant 
the request can be denied at that 
point. If Crown cannot establish the 
relevance or lack thereof based on 
the request itself the police will be 
asked to supply the information to 
Crown. If Crown then determines that 
the material is relevant it will be 
supplied to Defence. If Crown 
determines the material is not 
relevant then, depending on the 
nature of the evidence they can, or 
may be obligated to, withhold it. Any 
disputes at that point are to be 
resolved before the trial judge. 
It has been argued that the 
disclosure requirements from 
Stinchcombe and the related cases 
that have followed have placed an 
onerous burden on the Crown and the 
police and have done nothing more 
than permit the Defence to tailor 
strategy to correspond with material 
that it knows the Crown controls. This 
author believes that this is not the 
case. On the contrary, experience 
has often shown that the more 
information that is initially supplied to 
Crown for transmission to Defence 
the less likelihood that the Crown, and 
thus the investigating officer, will be 
faced with providing further 
information in the future. Experience 
has also shown that the more 
complete the information supplied to 
Defence initially, the greater the 
likelihood of either a plea or, at the 
least, an ability to focus the issues to 
be dealt with during the trial; thus 
shortening the trial process itself. The 
more you show and tell, the quicker 
Defence will likely conclude that 
running a trial may not be the best 
option. 
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Bridging the Gap - Who Provides 
Legal Advice to the Police? 
Craig S. MacMillan, B.A., M.A., LLB (BC Bar) 
Stephen N. S. Thatcher, B.A., LLB. (BC Bar) 
It cannot be assumed that law 
enforcement agencies in British 
Columbia receive effective and 
independent legal advice on 
operational and policy issues. 
Police agencies in this province 
receive legal services in a 
patchwork manner. In a time of 
increased public scrutiny of police 
conduct, complicated and 
conflicting legal decisions, 
legislation and policy, this is a wholly 
unsatisfactory circumstance. Apart 
from exposing police agencies and 
their individual officers to increasing 
legal jeopardy, it does little to 
enhance the prospects of a well-
regarded law enforcement model. 
This article will argue the 
inappropriateness of the status quo 
and propose a solution. 
Despite the public's belief that 
the police are purely preventers and 
investigators of crime, police 
responsibilities extend far beyond 
that mandate. As we all know, 
performing even common police 
functions can be fraught with 
complications, some of which an 
investigator may not even realise 
exist. Consider the legal direction 
required to manage the ever-
changing law surrounding police 
obligations under the Charter (e.g. 
search and seizure), complicated 
statutory amendments (e.g. Part VI 
authorizations), conflicting and 
ambiguous legislative obligations 
(e.g. legislation governing police 
records 1 ), developing civil 
responsibilities (e.g. duty to notify2 ) 
and detailed policy statements from 
governmental bodies (e.g. Attorney 
General guidelines on- relationship 
violence3 ). The need for legal 
advice by police agencies to support 
operational and policy decision 
making is self-evident. The real 
issue to be resolved is who should 
provide the police with that advice? 
The Separation of 
Investigations & Prosecutions 
A common misconception is that 
provincial Crown Counsel (and federal 
Crown Counsel) who prosecute 
offences provide the police with 
general legal advice. The Crown 
Counsel Policy Manual states that 
'While Crown Counsel is expected to 
provide legal advice to the police 
regarding cases and general policy, the 
police should be advised to seek 
advice from their own· counsel 
regarding questions about their own 
conduct or behaviour."4 In practice, 
this statement has been interpreted to 
mean that Crown Counsel do not 
provide general operational or policy 
legal advice to the police. Outside of 
statutorily mandated situations where 
Crown Counsel has some involvement 
during an "investigation" (e.g. Part VI 
authorizations), they will generally only 
provide legal advice concerning 
specific files for which a Report to 
Crown Counsel has already been 
submitted. 
Crown Counsel in British Columbia 
do not see it as their role to provide 
general legal advice to the police. The 
reasons for this are sound and 
supportable. Our policing and 
prosecution model is founded upon the 
separation between the police that 
investigate and the Crown that 
charges/prosecutes. 5 The role of 
Crown Counsel is independently to 
assess and present the evidence 
gathered by the police in a fair 
manner. 6 Crown Counsel are not 
advocates for the police, nor are the 
police their "client." By virtue of this fact 
a number of conflicts are avoided. 
First, it would be inherently 
contradictory for the agency that 
provided legal advice during an 
investigation (or on operational policy 
matters) to also be tasked with making 
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determinations of criminal 
misconduct against police officers 
that followed the advice. Second, if 
Crown Counsel advice was provided 
to the police, and it was incorrect, 
the same agency would be, in effect, 
reviewing its own decision and 
action. Such scenarios are more 
than mere supposition, they have in 
fact occurred.7 The other problem, 
as some individual police officers 
and departments have found out, is 
that the advice provided by Crown 
Counsel is probably not protected by 
solicitor-client privilege.8 
Compromising Police 
Independence 
In addition to Crown Counsel that 
deal with criminal prosecutions, there 
are also lawyers at the federal, 
provincial and municipal level 
("Government Counsel") who act as 
in-house legal advisers to those 
governments and their various 
agencies. The RCMP obtains its 
legal advice from the Department of 
Justice ("DOJ"). Provincial law 
enforcement agencies, such as 
CLEU, may obtain legal advice from 
the Legal Services Branch of the 
Ministry of Attorney General. 
Municipal police get some 
operational and policy assistance 
from municipal legal departments. 
This practice has a serious 
implication: because Government 
Counsel are not acting solely on 
behalf of the police agency, it is 
immediately apparent that the 
"operational independence" of the 
police and their investigations are 
compromised in several respects.9 
"Politically sensitive" 
investigations provide a clear 
example of how operational 
independence is being 
compromised. Reflect on the actual 
or perceived position of the Attorney 
General of British Columbia during 
the Nanaimo Commonwealth 
Holding Society investigation by the 
RCMP. In this particular case, the 
Attorney General is both a member 
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of the political party that is under 
investigation, and the member of 
Cabinet whose portfolio includes not 
only policing, but also the branch 
responsible for prosecuting such 
cases. Although the RCMP handled 
this case and could have consulted 
the DOJ on legal issues related to it, 
if the responsibility had fallen on a 
provincial or municipal law 
enforcement agency, how could the 
independence of the investigation be 
maintained if the department had to 
rely on advice from Crown Counsel 
or Legal Services Branch? Indeed, 
as a result of the real or perceived 
lack of independence of provincial 
Crown Counsel from the Executive, 
there have been renewed calls for the 
creation of an independent 
prosecution service that is not subject 
to the control and direction of the 
Attorney General. 10 The same 
rationale applies to providing 
independent legal services to the 
police. 
At the federal level, the DOJ, by 
statute, is singularly responsible for 
providing legal advice to the federal 
government and its agencies.11 The 
DOJ's top official, the Minister of 
Justice (and ex officio the Attorney 
General of Canada), is not only a 
member of the political party in power, 
but a member of Cabinet. These facts 
raise serious concerns about the 
control, actual or perceived, that the 
federal Attorney General exercises 
over RCMP investigations, especially 
when the investigation is politically 
sensitive (i.e. Airbus). Contrary to the 
reported assertion of the Minister of 
Justice in a recent speech, RCMP 
investigations can be directly or 
indirectly influenced by the Minister/ 
DOJ because it is the body that 
provides legal advice to the RCMP.12 
These examples clearly highlight the 
potential for political infringement of 
"independent'' police investigations, 
whether actual or perceived. Failure 
to pro'{ide independent legal services 
to the police will compromise the 
fundamental recommendation by the 
Oppal Commission that "The 
province enshrine in legislation the 
principles that: (a) a police officer is 
not subject to direction from any 
level of government in deciding 
whether to investigate an alleged 
offence, how to do so and whether 
to recommend that charges be 
laid."13 
·The role of government is to 
govern and to institute laws and 
policies intended to implement its 
objectives. It must, however, be 
remembered that government 
legislation and policy (which is not 
law) is not always determined to be 
lawful or constitutional by the courts. 
Often overlooked is that police 
agencies may be directed by 
legislation (e.g. Child, Family and 
Community SeNice Act14 and Bill C-
41 regarding criminal Sentencing 
Reform 15 ) and detailed policy 
dictates from government bodies 
(e.g. Chief Provincial Firearms 
Officer policy on revocation of 
firearms related documents16 ) to 
take action the lawfulness of which 
may be questionable or ambiguous. 
While the objectives of these laws 
and policies may be desirable, it is 
still incumbent on the police to 
ensure their conduct is not unlawful 
or improper. The problem here is 
that the police are required to get 
legal advice from the very Crown 
or Government Counsel who 
advised the government on the 
development of the policy and 
drafted the legislation in issue. Such 
a circumstance is not only 
inappropriate, but also clearly 
necessitates that law enforcement 
agencies obtain independent legal 
advice. 
Furthermore, operational 
independence may not be sustained 
when Government Counsel 
represent the interests of the police 
in civil matters. The DOJ, while 
representing the RCMP, is also 
responsible for providing legal 
services to other federal agencies 
and representing any other interests 
the Government of Canada might 
have. For example, in a recent civil 
case the plaintiff sued the RCMP, 
Corrections Canada and the 
National Parole Board. 17 The same 
DOJ lawyer represented all three 
federal agencies. Even if DOJ 
supplied separate lawyers or private 
counsel (who still report to the DOJ) 
for each agency (which is not likely) 
and advised them to fight the case in 
the best interests of their respective 
agency (also unlikely) there would still 
be the perception of conflict. The DOJ 
is, perhaps appropriately, not 
necessarily concerned with the best 
outcome for the agencies concerned, 
but the best outcome for the 
Government of Canada. Analogous 
situations exist at the provincial and 
municipal levels. In such 
circumstances, who is protecting the 
best interests of the police agency? 
What must be recognized is that 
the interests of the police cannot 
necessarily be equated with those of 
the federal, provincial or municipal 
government. Unlike some 
government functions such as road 
repair or even health care, law 
enforcement agencies have a unique 
role in our society and their functional 
independence and accountability 
necessitate separate representation. 
Otherwise, by design or default, the 
separation, independence and 
function of the police can be eroded 
or subverted by interests that are not 
necessarily legitimate. 
One final comment must be made 
with respect to Government Counsel 
providing legal advice to the police. 
In a time of shrinking budgets and 
personnel resources, many 
government legal departments simply 
do not have the resources to meet 
the growing demands of police 
agencies. In today's policing 
environment, operational police 
officers frequently need prompt, 
round-the-clock legal advice on 
matters that are highly technical and 
situationally based. Sound advice in 
such circumstances requires 
knowledge of investigational 
techniques and strategies, an 
understanding of the operational 
policing environment, and a solid 
grounding in areas of the law relevant 
to police operations. As a practical 
matter, because the demands of 
government are so different from the 
demands of policing, not all 
Government Counsel have the 
necessary skills or knowledge to 
advise on police matters. While it is 
always dangerous to generalize, the 
consistent theme encountered by the 
authors in speaking with operational 
police personnel is dissatisfaction 
with both the quality and timeliness 
of the legal service provided by their 
respective Government Counsel. 
Legally Trained Police 
Officers 
Many police departments have 
tried to fill the gap in the delivery of 
legal services, to some degree, with 
police officers who have law degrees. 
Most such arrangements have been 
relatively informal, and, until recently, 
the appropriateness of using legally 
trained police officers to provide legal 
advice to a department was not really 
questioned. However, the giving of 
"legal advice" can constitute the 
"practice of law" as defined in s. 1 of 
the Legal Profession Act.18 Unless the 
legally trained officer is also a 
member of the Law Society of British 
Columbia (the "Society''), the member 
is engaged in the "unauthorized 
practice of law;' a matter the Society 
takes very seriously. In the authors' 
view, if a legally trained police officer 
is providing legal advice to the 
department, that officer must be 
called to the Bar. Furthermore, in 
order to protect the interests of both 
the member concerned and the 
department, there must be formal 
recognition by each that the member 
is providing legal services.19 
However, despite their inability to 
provide the legal services required in 
policing, and despite the actual or 
perceived conflict with respect to the 
operational independence principle, 
Government Counsel (usually citing 
policy or statutory authority) zealously 
assert that only they can provide legal 
advice to the respective police 
agency. Such claims seem purely 
self-serving, fail to recognize the 
important principles at stake, and 
ignore the simple steps required to 
recognize the legal work that can be 
undertaken by legally trained police 
officers. 
A Proposal 
The historic desire that the police 
be free from political interference in 
conducting investigations must 
include the provision of independent 
legal advice on operational and policy 
matters. The need to be independent 
from political interference is not 
inconsistent with the general tenets 
of political/public accountability of the 
police and the provision of 
independent legal advice to the 
department. In fact, it makes the 
chain of accountability clearer. The 
need for independence in police 
investigations necessitates that 
structurally and functionally the police 
obtain independent legal advice. As 
noted in Police-Challenge 2000: 
The legal resources of police 
services may have to be 
expanded in the future. With the 
Charter and the growing legal 
accountability of police 
departments, legal advice 
concerning investigative 
practices is needed on an 
ongoing basis. In the past, 
Crown attorneys would be asked 
for their advice, but it might now 
be necessary to retain lawyers 
on staff who could be involved 
in the development of police 
practices and policies.20 
In the authors' view, the integrity 
of police independence and 
investigations not only require, but 
demand, that legal advice be 
obtained from in-house counsel. It is 
perhaps in response to this need that 
some municipal forces are starting to 
bring counsel "in-house:• Curiously, 
while there is no shortage of 
operational issues for resolution, the 
drive to bring counsel in-house for 
municipal police agencies was given 
momentum by the passage of the 
Freedom of Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act. 21 This 
legislation provides a complex 
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legislative basis for the management 
and access of information held by the 
government in British Columbia, 
including law enforcement agencies. 
Most municipal departments of any 
size have had to designate a person 
whose role it is to oversee their 
respective departments' compliance 
with the FOIPPA. The Vancouver 
Police Department and the Victoria 
Police Department originally 
• j 
devolved the function onto legally 
trained police officers, but have since 
hired civilian lawyers to oversee their 
respective FOi offices. The 
complexity of the FOIPPA and its 
interaction with federal and other 
provincial legislation raises numerous 
legal issues. 
After much deliberation and 
discussion with other police 
colleagues, the authors believe that 
the police in British Columbia must 
take the initiative to secure the 
provision of independent legal 
advice. There are a number of 
potential models, but based on the 
need to maximize limited resources, 
the authors recommend that 
municipal police departments, 
provincial law enforcement agencies 
and the RCMP form a police legal 
services centre that would be 
comprised of police officers that are 
called to the Bar and civilian lawyers. 
This mixed model would maximize 
resources and experience, eliminate 
research redundancy that currently 
exists, and it would provide ongoing 
timely and competent legal and policy 
advice on matters affecting. the 
police. Another important feature of 
this model is that it would ensure that 
the police develop and utilize 
consistent policy approaches on 
important issues such as police 
pursuits. Such a modelWould also 
be invaluable for providing important 
policy papers and research on 
proposed policy initiatives that affect 
the police. Most importantly, this 
model would brush aside any real or 
potential allegations of political 
interference in police investigations 
and restore the operational 
independence principle. One thing 
is clear: if the police continue to rely 
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on the current seat-of-the-pants-
approach, and do not move ahead 
cooperatively to bridge the gap in the 
provision of legal services, the 
independence and effectiveness of 
law enforcement will be reduced. 
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Operational Notes 
R. v.. Cook (BCCA) 
Ruled that Canadian police officers must 
administer the Charter when question-
ing suspects in a foreign jurisdiction. 
R. v.. Hutchings (BCCA) 
Held that the use of a forward looking 
infrared radar (FUR) device on a helicop-
ter to detect a marihuna operation in a 
barn was not unconstitutional because 
there was no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the circumstance. 
R. v.. Cyr (BCSC) 
When a police officer could not visually 
identify the accused in court, the accused 
was ordered by the court to remove his 
shirt to reveal identifying tattoos. The 
tatoos could be used for identification. 
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